STR
OMT
SIM
Jo-Ellen Pozner
Santa Clara U., United States
Shu Zhang
U. of Wisconsin, Madison, United States
Aharon Cohen Mohliver
London Business School, United Kingdom
Alessandro Piazza
Rice U., United States
Sarah Gordon
McGill U. - Desautels Faculty of Management, Canada
Jordan Siegel
U. of Michigan, Ross School of Business, United States
Jin Hyung Kim
George Washington U., United States
Strategic management research around organizational wrongdoing has made considerable progress in elucidating how these practices spread both within and across organizations. Central to much of this literature is the logic, famously articulated by Becker (1968), that wrongdoing follows from rational calculation weighing the perceived upsides of these actions against perceived downsides. Integrating perspectives from strategic management, management scholars have enriched this perspective, illustrating how wrongdoing fits into firms’ broader efforts to enhance performance. Naturally, this work has inspired corresponding research on deterrence, wherein greater attention to the strategic motivations for organizational wrongdoing informs novel theories regarding how it may be preempted or cauterized. This symposium brings together scholars whose work is at the cutting edge of these questions. It showcases work illustrating novel motivations for wrongdoing, as well as novel explanations for how and why certain deterrence strategies may prove especially effective. By doing this, we believe this symposium will enhance our understanding on corporate wrongdoing and how it can be more effectively deterred.
Author: Aharon Cohen Mohliver – London Business School
Author: Alessandro Piazza – Rice U.
Author: Sarah Gordon – McGill U. - Desautels Faculty of Management
Author: Jin Hyung Kim – George Washington U.