Integrating the broker’s and the alters’ motivations, this paper proposes a novel framework that sheds light on the dynamics of triadic closure. We integrate broker-centric and alter-centric approaches by bringing the insights of social exchange theory into network analysis. We show how status can be a critical factor generating opposite effects on brokers’ versus alters’ motivations. In a directional network, high-status brokers are less likely to close the triad than low status brokers, but alters are more likely to collapse the structural hole when the brokers are high-status; high-status alters are less likely than low-status alters to be invited by the broker to close the triad, but are more likely than low-status alters to be invited by co-alters to close the triad. Furthermore, we argue that when conflicting motivations arise between brokers and alters, the latter’s motivations are more likely to dominate.