Subsidiary general managers (GMs) play a central role in foreign subsidiary governance. While their exit represents a loss of human capital for multinational companies (MNCs), we know relatively little about the dynamics underlying the phenomenon of subsidiary GM turnover. In this study, we thus address the subject by exploring the effects of MNC board tenure heterogeneity and CEO network size on GM turnover rates. Grounded in the tenets of upper echelons theory and using a longitudinal dataset with 6,577 observations across 1,603 foreign subsidiaries of Japanese MNCs between 2004 and 2020, we argue and show that greater heterogeneity in board tenures reduces the likelihood of subsidiary GM turnover. This finding supports the value-in-diversity perspective that MNC boards with greater tenure heterogeneity can enable better-informed decisions on foreign subsidiary GM turnover, thereby reducing the likelihood of premature dismissals or public scapegoating. However, we further find that CEOs with larger network sizes can override the attenuating effect of board tenure heterogeneity on subsidiary GM turnover rates, which we attribute to three interrelated mechanisms: relational power, signaling inclination, and informal knowledge-sharing. Together, these findings advance understanding of strategic leadership interfaces and the interdependent roles of top managers in international business contexts.
