New CEOs, particularly those who come from outside the organization, are often mandated to bring about significant change. However, they also require time to familiarize themselves with the firm and their role before making consequential strategic decisions. Drawing from attention-based view and expectancy violations theory, we suggest that the speed, intensity, and novelty of competitive actions taken by new CEOs would affect differently the early-tenure dismissal likelihoods for new outsider and new insider CEOs. In our sample of S&P 1500 successions between 2005 and 2015, we find that new outsider CEOs who initiate competitive actions soon after succession face a greater likelihood of early-tenure dismissal than insider CEOs initiating quickly competitive actions. Furthermore, new outsider CEOs who initiate multiple competitive actions or embrace continuity with the prior CEO’s actions are more likely to be dismissed early, while new outsider CEOs who initiate novel competitive actions are less likely to face early-tenure dismissal. These relationships are reversed for new insider CEOs. Our research highlights the heterogenous effects of competitive actions repertoire, novelty and speed for new insider and outsider CEOs, and their significant practical implications.
