The movement of individuals between roles in private-sector firms and the government is a common phenomenon known as the revolving door. While revolving door movements are widely assumed to benefit firms, their establishment also generates varying levels of media attention. This attention has been theorized in other contexts to limit the discretion of government officials and firms to engage in mutually beneficial political exchanges. We argue that media attention poses a boundary condition on the ability of firms to attain benefits from these connections. Focusing on revolving door connections established when corporate executives move to senior positions in the government since the year 2000, we reexamine the performance impact of these ties. Using synthetic control methodology, we analyze the post-appointment Tobin’s Q of firms following the movement of their senior executives to the U.S. federal government. Our analyses suggest that when media attention to these moves is greater, the firms of those departed executives experience decreased market expectations. Furthermore, we find little evidence that these firms benefit from these moves, regardless of media attention. Our findings highlight the importance of the social context surrounding revolving door movements and have critical implications for research on corporate political connections.