Using mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as a proxy, and looking at the case of the US, we find that managers from firms that are more able to substitute human workers with artificial intelligence (AI) are likely to adopt aggressive corporate investment policies, and thereby are more prone to engage in M&As. We reveal that internal and external corporate governance moderates the relationship between AI automation susceptibility and M&A investments. The results hold after the consideration of selection bias and endogeneity issues. At a theoretical level, our study builds on earlier work that suggests a linkage between AI and market concentration. The structural intersectional theoretical literature focuses on the impact of AI-using firms on other actors, but intentionally casts a wide net; it is held that the AI has complex and polyvalent effects, and its usage of data and decision making is one that seeks to afford clear advantage to those deploying it. There is also an association between firm usage of AI and the concentration of markets. This study seeks to deepen this understanding by exploring the approach of AI deploying firms towards others in their sphere; they are more prone to acquiring those firms who supply them or who they supply, which in turn, is likely to contribute to the further foreclosure of competition. We draw out the implications for policy and practice.
