In prior research, new firms are expected to convey observable signals of their latent quality directly to potential resource-providers in an effort to reduce uncertainty and ease resource mobilization. However, platforms increasingly intermediate between new firms and prospective resource-providers. This paper examines the use of signals by platforms for their gatekeeping (selection) and brokerage (selective promotion) decisions. Adopting a cognitive perspective on signaling, we posit that social impact signals will affect platforms' gatekeeping less than their brokerage decisions. Moreover, we hypothesize that platform decision-makers’ personal pro-social motivation will amplify the effect of social impact signals on their decision-making, and especially so for brokerage decisions. We test and validate our theory through a conjoint experiment with decision-makers of equity crowdfunding platforms, an important intermediary between new firms and investors. Overall, our study contributes by integrating the role of intermediaries into signaling theory and highlighting how platform decision-makers employ signals differentially to determine what prospective resource-providers can see through their gatekeeping and how they see it through their brokering activities.
