In our study, we explore the dynamics of strategic deviance and social control among Amsterdam's cannabis coffeeshops from 2009 to 2018, a context marked by legal ambiguities and complex social norms. Through an empirical analysis of coffeeshop menu data and enforcement actions, we examine the competitive behaviors of these businesses in response to social control measures. Counter to assumptions that the scrutiny associated with social control may suppress competition, we propose that violators escalate competitive behavior to signal resilience while avoiding stirring intragroup tensions. We also argue that non-deviant actors will sanction violators through competitive behavior to contain opportunism, and that violators will encroach on rival offerings and lower pricing after interventions, targeting only non-deviant shops to recoup losses. Overall, our study sheds light on the heretofore unexamined competitive consequences of social control, highlighting the tenuous tradeoffs that exist at the nexus of deviant behavior, its social control, and market competition.