Executive compensation serves as a crucial tool for motivating executives to align with shareholders' interests. This study investigates the differences in compensation levels of executives between family-owned and non-family-owned firms, as well as the impact of family control on executive compensation. Utilizing publicly listed companies in Taiwan as the sample, the study finds that there is no significant difference in the total compensation of top executives between family-owned and non-family-owned firms. However, family-owned firms are more inclined to offer top executives higher fixed salaries and fewer incentive bonuses. In family firms, the extent of family control positively influences top executives' fixed salaries while having a negative impact on their variable incentive cash bonuses. Moreover, the presence of family directors weakens the positive correlation between family ownership and top executives' fixed compensation, as well as the negative relationship between family ownership and cash bonuses. In terms of performance, incentivized bonuses show a positive and significant impact on firm financial performance, while fixed salary does not demonstrate a direct association with firm performance. This study extends our understanding of executive compensation in family firms, it sheds light on how family influence compensation structure and ultimately affect firm performance.