This study examines the effect of the Paris Climate Agreement, as a plausibly exogenous shock, on the issuance of corporate green bonds (CGBs), a new financial instrument to address climate change in line with the goals of the Agreement. We argue that firms in industries that contribute most to climate change are potentially more affected by the Agreement because they perceive themselves as the target of the upcoming national environmental regulations derived from the Agreement. So firms in the affected industries are more likely to issue CGBs after the Agreement than firms in the minimally affected (or unaffected) industries. This differential effect becomes stronger among firms in countries with more media attention on environmental issues, but weaker in countries with more stringent legal enforcement. Using a proprietary cross-national dataset of CGBs and difference-in-differences estimation, we find strong support for our hypotheses. This study advances our understanding of the intersection between firms’ green financing as a form of self-regulation and the broader institutional context, and responds to the recent call for more research on integrating multiple pressures that jointly shape firms’ environmental behaviors.